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Professor Jacqueline Nolan-Haley

Does ADR’s “Access to Justice” Come at the Expense of Meaningful Consent?

I.

Introduction

Legal scholars and policymakers are rightly concerned with access to justice, asking whether
potential litigants from all economic backgrounds have meaningful access to the legal system.1
One response to this concern has been the promotion of alternative dispute resolution (ADR).2
Over the last forty years, ADR processes, in particular mediation and arbitration, have been
advanced as vehicles to secure access to justice for individual litigants,3 and to improve
efficiency in overburdened court systems.4 These processes have functioned as alternatives to
the court adjudication of disputes, complementing the judicial system, and operating in what has
been famously described as “the shadow of the law.”5 The primary benefits promised by ADR
were party autonomy and empowerment.6 ADR processes would allow parties to “fit the forum
1

In this Article, the discussion of access to justice is limited to the civil justice system. Much has been written about the
crisis in civil justice that has afflicted the lowest levels of the state court system -- informal courts, including Family,
Small Claims and Housing courts. Nineteen million civil cases are filed each year in these courts, and the majority
of these cases involve self-represented parties, who typically are low-income and members of a vulnerable
population. See Jessica Steinberg, Demand Side Reform in the Poor People’s Court, 47 CONN. L. REV. 741, 748-49
(2015). In addition to the increase in self-represented litigants, court budgets in the informal courts have been greatly
reduced. See Heather Scheiwe Kulp, Increasing Referrals to Small Claims Mediation Programs: Models to Improve
Access to Justice, 14 CARDOZO, J. CONFLICT RESOL. 361 (2013).
2

ADR is an umbrella term that refers to alternatives to the court adjudication of disputes. The term ADR is also
referred to as “appropriate dispute resolution,” and “amicable dispute resolution.”
3

See STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION, AND OTHER PROCESSES 4-7
(6th ed. 2012) (describing goals and purposes of ADR movement); Larry Spain, Alternative Dispute Resolution for
the Poor: Is it an Alternative, 70 N.D. L. REV. 269 (1994).
4

This is true in many countries. See generally FELIX STEFFEK ET AL., REGULATING DISPUTE RESOLUTION: ADR
AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE AT THE CROSSROADS (2013); EU MEDIATION LAW HANDBOOK: REGULATORY ROBUSTNESS
RATINGS FOR MEDIATION REGIMES (Nadja Alexander et al. eds., 2017).
5

Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.
J. 950 (1979) (first describing the term in the context of divorce).
See Baruch Bush, Efficiency and Protection, or Empowerment and Recognition: The Mediator’s Role and Ethical
Standards, 41 FLA. L. REV. 253 (1989). Other perceived benefits included improving public satisfaction with the
6

1

to the fuss.”7 These processes would give parties the opportunity to create their own mosaic of
justice, personalized and individualized justice, not unlike the fairness remedies that equity
courts had historically provided.8
Beyond the claims of individualized justice and efficiency, the reach of ADR’s vision was
ambitious, extending to multiple horizons. Scholars pushed its potential to promote transitional
justice, the rule of law, 9 and international human rights. 10 Governments commissioned
advisory groups to study ways that ADR could be used to improve access to justice,11 and under
the rubric of access to justice, ADR transformed civil justice systems. ADR has been exported to
many developing countries under rule of law programs 12 and invoked in international
peacemaking and diplomacy efforts.13 More recently, the Global Pound Conference has engaged
in conversations with multiple stakeholders in over thirty-one countries to determine how to

court system, increasing voluntary compliance with agreements, emphasizing the importance of neighborhood and
community values and providing access to forums for people with problems, and providing alternatives to violence
and litigation for the resolution of disputes. Goldberg, supra note 3 at 6.
7

Frank E. A. Sander & Stephen B. Goldberg, Fitting the Forum to the Fuss: A User-Friendly Guide to Selecting an
ADR Procedure, 10 NEG. J. 49 (1994).
8

Thomas O. Main, ADR: The New Equity, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 329 (2005); Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Merger of
Law and Mediation: Lessons from Equity Jurisprudence and Roscoe Pound, 6 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 57
(2004).
9

Michal Alberstein, Using ADR to Promote Transitional Justice and the Rule of Law, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Summer
2010, at 25. But see Jean Sternlight, Is Alternative Dispute Resolution Consistent with the Rule of Law? Lessons
from Abroad, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 569 (2007) (raising multiple questions about the relationship between ADR and
the rule of law).
10

Chris DeLaubenfels, The Problem with the Duty to Adjudicate: How Mediations Can Promote International
Human Rights, 46 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 541 (2013).
11

Dr. Lola Akin Ojeolabi, Improving Access to Justice through Alternative Dispute Resolution: The Role of
Community Legal Centres in Victoria, Australia, Research Report, LA TROBE UNIVERSITY (Sept. 2010), at 6.
12

Amy J. Cohen, Debating the Globalization of U.S. Mediation: Politics, Power, and Practice in Nepal, 11 HARV.
NEGOT. L. REV. 295 (2006); See Maria Dakolias, A Strategy for Judicial Reform: The Experience in Latin America,
36 VA. J. INT’L L. 167, 200-06 (1995).
13

U.N. Secretary-General, Strengthening the Role of Mediation in the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, Conflict
Prevention and Resolution, U.N. DOC. A/68/811 (June 25, 2012); United Nations Guidance for Effective Mediation,
annex (2012); U.N. Secretary-General, Enhancing Mediation and its Support Activities, U.N. DOC. S/2009/189
(April 8, 2009).
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improve access to justice and ADR throughout the world.14 Scholars and policymakers continue
to make the claim that the availability of ADR processes offers access to justice.15
Claims about ADR’s ability to provide access to justice should be more modest. For, as it
turns out, ADR falls short on its original promises, giving short shrift to the value of consent.
Over the last few decades, party autonomy has diminished in both mediation and arbitration, and
it is not clear that ADR has resulted in greater efficiencies for the courts. 16 In this Article, I
question whether ADR processes have provided the kind of access to justice envisioned by
proponents, or whether they have been stumbling blocks to achieving that goal.17 My skepticism
is prompted by the withering away of consent18 in arbitration and mediation, two of the most
commonly used ADR processes.19 Arbitration and mediation have traditionally been considered
consensual processes based on the foundational principles of autonomy and self-determination.20

14

Bryan J. Branon, The Global Pound Conference Series: Shaping the Future of Dispute Resolution and Improving
Access to Justice A Truly Global Event, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/dispute_resolution/newsletter/sept2016/branon_shapin
g_the_future.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Jan. 24, 2018).
15

Task Force on Access to Justice and Alternative Dispute Resolution, Access to Justice through Alternative
Dispute Resolution White Paper, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (2015) [hereinafter ABA White Paper],
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/images/dispute_resolution/publications/A2J_%20white_paper.pdf
(last visited Jan. 24, 2018); Kulp, supra note 1, at 362 (2013). See also Rebecca Love Kourlis et al., A Court
Compass for Litigants, INSTITUTE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM (July 2016)
(proposing a portal through which people could access an online dispute resolution model (including mediation) for
resolving certain family law issues).
See Donna Shestowsky, Disputants’ Preferences for Court-Connected Dispute Resolution Procedures: Why We
Should Care and Why We Know So Little, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 549, 560-62 (2008) (there is little
empirical evidence to support the claim that ADR processes result in efficiency). Moreover, litigants may be
unaware of the availability of ADR processes. See Donna Shestowsky, When Ignorance Is Not Bliss: An Empirical
Study of Litigants’ Awareness of Court-Sponsored Alternative Dispute Resolution Programs, 22 HARV. NEGOT. L.
REV. (2017).
16

17

See Anna Nylund, Access to Justice: Is ADR a Help or Hindrance, in THE FUTURE OF CIVIL LITIGATION: ACCESS
TO COURTS AND COURT-ANNEXED MEDIATION IN THE NORDIC COUNTRIES, 325, 333 (Laura Ervo & Anna Nylunc
eds., 2014) (observing that in practice court-connected mediation does not contribute to an increased access to
justice).
18

In this Article, the term consent means informed consent. See text accompanying notes 110-112 infra.

19

In this Article, the term ADR processes refers to arbitration and mediation.

20

See, e.g., Edward Brunet, Replacing Folklore Arbitration with a Contract Model of Arbitration, 74 TUL. L. REV.
39, 65 (1999); Clark Freshman, Tweaking the Market for Autonomy: A Problem-Solving Perspective to Informed
Consent in Arbitration, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 909 (2002) (noting that autonomy is a key value in arbitration). But
see Hiro N. Aragaki, Does Rigorously Enforcing Arbitration Agreements Promote “Autonomy”?, 91 IND. L. J. 1143

3

Consider the familiar mantra that arbitration is a creature of contract,21 or, that mediation is a
voluntary, consensual process.22 But, this rhetoric does not always reflect reality. In their zeal to
relieve congested dockets and reduce business litigation costs, courts, legislatures, administrative
agencies, and corporate officers have pushed to sell mediation, arbitration, and online versions of
these processes.23 Many times they do so with little regard for the consensual nature of these
processes.24 For example, arbitration has actually limited access to justice within the context of
consumer and employment arbitration, rather than enabled it.25 The same can be said of how
some mediation foreclosure programs have operated.26
The shift away from consent in ADR disrespects the parties served by these processes.
Beyond its assault on human dignity, the erosion of consent in consensual ADR processes is at
odds with the values of the access to justice movement, and raises multiple policy questions--To
what extent do mediation and arbitration, the most common forms of ADR, as practiced today,
reflect the fairness values of the access to justice movement?27 Does fairness include substantive

(2015) (questioning the extent to which autonomy provides a basis for the strong enforcement of arbitration
agreements).
21

See, e.g., United Steelworkers of America v. American Manufacturing co. 363 U.S. 564, 571 (1960); Hall Street
Assocs., LLC v. Mattel, Inc. 552 U.S. 576, 585 (2008); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339
(2011). But see Hiro N. Aragaki, Arbitration: Creature of Contract, Pillar of Procedure, 8 Y.B. ARB. & MED. 2
(2016) (questioning the persuasiveness of this claim).
22

Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION [hereinafter ABA Model Standards],
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/dispute_resolution/model_standards_conduct_a
pril2007.authcheckdam.pdf.
See Shannon Salter, Online Dispute Resolution and Justice System Integration: British Columbia’s Civil
Resolution Tribunal, 34 WINDSOR YEARBOOK OF ACCESS TO JUSTICE (2017) (arguing that the promise of ODR for
increasing access to justice cannot be recognized unless it is fully integrated into the public justice system).
23

For a critique of ODR’s ability to provide access to justice, see Robert J. Condlin, Online Dispute Resolution:
Stinky, Repugnant or Drab, 18 CARDOZO J. OF CONFLICT RESOL. 717 (2017).
24

25

See text accompanying notes 81-84 infra. For a proposal to remedy the lack of consent in some forms of
arbitration, see Imre S.Szalai, The Consent Amendment: Restoring Meaningful Consent and Respect for Human
Dignity in America’s Civil Justice System, 24 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 195 (2017)(forthcoming).
26

See, e.g., GMAC Mortgage, LLC v. Willoughby, 165 A.3d 787 (N.J. 2017).

27

Some countries make a conscious effort to reconcile mediation with the values of the access to justice movement.
See, e.g., Mary Anne Noone & Lola Akin Ojelabi, Ensuring Access to Justice in Mediation within the Civil Justice
System, 40 MONASH U. L. REV. 528 (2014) (stating that in the context of Australia-- “Ensuring mediation reflects
the values of the access to justice movement is a goal which policy makers, practitioners, and courts and tribunals
aspire to.”).

4

as well as procedural justice?28 To what extent can mediation or arbitration, as a vehicle for
increasing access to justice, provide an adequate framework for protecting rights when consent is
diminished or eliminated? 29 ADR processes are often promoted as alternatives to the courts,
giving parties the opportunity to bargain in the shadow of the law or in some cases, in the pale
shadow of the law.30 But, what if courts are the venue for the justice that people are seeking? At
a more basic level is the question of what is meant by “access to justice.” Few would disagree
that it is a core value in upholding the rule of law but there is less agreement over what the term
includes.31 Does it include, for example, access to processes that can resolve disputes? Does it
mean access to courts that can offer litigants just results based on law? Or, is it a broader concept
that includes innovative approaches for developing systemic solutions for delivering justice?32
These questions are relevant because they implicate the rule of law, a fundamental value
in any system of justice. As noted by the European Court of Human Rights in 1975, “one can
scarcely conceive of the rule of law without there being a possibility of having access to the

Ellen Waldman & Lola Akin Ojelabi, Mediators and Substantive Justice: A View from Rawls’ Original Position,
30 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 391 (2016); Noone & Ojelabi, supra note 27 (discussing empirical study on mediators
views regarding procedural and substantive justice).
28

29

Hazel Genn, What is Civil Justice For- Reform, ADR, and Access to Justice, 24 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 397, 416
(2012) (discussing Lord Neuberger’s speech at the Fourth Civil Mediation Council National Conference in which
[he] argued that neither arbitration nor ADR can provide a framework for securing the enforcement of rights and the
rule of law . . . .”).
30

Marianna Hernandez Crespo, A Systemic Perspective of ADR in Latin America: Enhancing the Shadow of the Law
Through Citizen Participation, 10 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 91 (2008).
31

See Craig A. McEwen & Laura Williams, Legal Policy and Access to Justice Through Courts and Mediation, 13
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 865 (1998) (discussing differing views of justice within the context of ADR and
mediation)
See e.g., Michele M. Leering, Enhancing the Legal Profession’s Capacity for Innovation: The Promise of
Reflective Practice and Action Research for Increasing Access to Justice, 34 WINDSOR YEAR BOOK ACCESS TO
JUSTICE 189, 193 (2017).
When the concept of access to justice expanded beyond courts and traditional reactive legal services this
provoked new ways of thinking about how the justice system should work and challenged assumptions
about the outcomes the justice sector should be expected to produce. This led to recommendations for
designing proactive systemic solutions to minimize the disruptive and spiraling impact of legal troubles,
developing approaches for the early resolution of legal problems, making dispute resolution and the justice
system more accessible, and devoting new resources to increasing legal literacy and legal capability, in
addition to other approaches.
32

5

courts.”33 Forty-two years later, the surge in the use of ADR processes has arguably hindered
access to the courts and given life to the European Court of Human Rights prescient statement.
Compulsory arbitration programs have effectively removed access to the courts for substantial
segments of the population, a reality which has not escaped the attention of some members of the
federal judiciary.34
Respect for human dignity and access to justice, the guidelines from this introductory
Part, will provide the standards against which these questions about ADR will be assessed. This
Article proceeds from here in four parts. Part II discusses the historical background of ADR’s
relationship to the access to justice movement. Part III describes the shift away from consensual
regimes in ADR, and Part IV focuses on the underlying value of consent in ADR processes. Part
V concludes with a call for more modesty in the claims made about ADR’s ability to offer
greater access to justice. It calls for increased vigilance in retaining the consensual features of
ADR in order to foster an “access to justice consciousness”35 that will motivate the legal
profession to continued awareness and action in securing meaningful access to the legal system
for all potential litigants.

II.

ADR: The Third Wave of the Access to Justice Movement

A. Historical Background
Access to justice is a fundamental principle of the rule of law. It is considered a basic
social right in modern societies, and today, it is a familiar rallying cry throughout many parts of

33

Golder v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 34 (1975) (Case cited in Lorna McGregor, Alternative Dispute
Resolution and Human Rights: Developing a Rights-Based Approach through the ECHR, 26 EUR. J. OF INT’L L. 607,
623 (2015)).
See, e.g., Jed S. Rakoff, Why You Won’t Get Your Day in Court, N Y. REV. OF BOOKS (Nov. 24, 2016),
http://nybooks.com/articles/2016/11/24/why-you-wont-get-your-day-in-court/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2018) (discussing
mandatory arbitration clauses as one of seven reasons that parties are precluded from access to courts).
34

See Leering, supra note 32, at 193 (describing “an evolving, formative, and normative concept about the
profession’s responsibility to be aware and act to ensure equal access to justice.”). Id. n.19.
35

6

the United States and the world.36 Policymakers deplore the justice deficits for impoverished
populations, the denial of legal rights and the pervasive lack of legal representation.37 Multiple
commissions, study groups and legislative efforts are working toward achieving access to
justice.38
In addition to being a fundamental principle of the rule of law, access to justice is both a
theoretical and a law reform movement for social change. This movement was described thirtynine years ago by Professors Mauro Cappelletti and Bryant Garth in their four-volume
international and interdisciplinary study of access to justice as a “worldwide movement to make
rights effective.” 39 Analyzing comparative global data, Cappelletti and Garth described what
they labeled as three waves of law reform--legal aid, procedural devices to support class actions,
and a third wave, promoting systemic reform of the legal system through ADR. 40 The core
values of the access to justice movement were understood as accessibility, and fairness.41
At the time of the publication of Cappelletti and Garth’s access to justice project, ADR
was already part of an emerging law reform movement in the United States. With the convening

36

See United Nations, Access to Justice, UNITED NATIONS AND THE RULE OF LAW,
https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/thematic-areas/access-to-justice-and-rule-of-law-institutions/access-to-justice/ (last
visited Jan. 24, 2018).
The term “access to justice” is frequently defined as “a way for low and middle-income to have access to
representation in order to help them fare better in the court system.” ABA White Paper, supra note 15, at 1.
Broader understandings of the term include innovation and systemic design changes in the justice system. See
Leering, supra note 32, at 193.
37

38

The American Bar Association has taken an active role and supported the development of state commissions to
collect and analyze data to fund civil legal aid. See generally NATIONAL CENTER FOR ACCESS TO JUSTICE,
http://ncforaj.org/ (last visited Jan. 25, 2018). The theme of the 2018 AALS Law Teachers Conference held in San
Diego in January 2018 was “Access to Justice.” See also Steinberg, supra note 1 (discussing access to justice
initiatives).
39

ACCESS TO JUSTICE, Vols. 1-4 (M. Cappelletti ed. 1978 & 1979).

40

Mauro Cappelletti, Alternative Dispute Resolution Processes within the Framework of the World-Wide Access-toJustice Movement, 56 MODERN L. REV. 282-284, 295 (1993). But see Anna Nylund, Access to Justice: Is ADR a
Help or Hindrance, in THE FUTURE OF CIVIL LITIGATION: ACCESS TO COURTS AND COURT-ANNEXED MEDIATION IN
THE NORDIC COUNTRIES, 325, 326 (Laura Ervo & Anna Nylunc, eds., 2014) (claiming that these categories are
based on a broad international analysis and do not necessarily fit the context of Nordic countries).
41

See Cappelletti, supra note 40, at 295. Since that time additional access to justice principles have been added by
other governments. See Noone & Ojelabi, supra note 27, at 561 (describing Australian ADR initiatives, including
the addition of the following principles: appropriateness, equity, efficiency and effectiveness).

7

of the Pound Conference in 1976, prominent members of the legal profession promoted the use
of ADR processes to improve overburdened court systems. Chief Justice Warren Burger led the
charge to improve poorly managed courts42 and would later pose what has now become a famous
question in the history of ADR—“Isn’t there a better way?” 43 Responding to the problem of
overcrowded courts, Professor Frank Sander authored an influential conference paper, proposing
the idea of a Multi-Door Courthouse where parties would be offered a range of judicial and nonjudicial processes to resolve their disputes.44 He conceptualized a close connection between the
courts and ADR processes which were to be considered alternatives to the court adjudication of
disputes, rather than a replacement of them. 45 The court would remain for Professor Sander
“one door of the multi-door courthouse.” 46
To increase the accessibility of their voluminous study, Cappelletti and Garth published
an article explaining some basic ideas underlying the access to justice movement. 47 In their
discussion of ADR as the “third wave” of the access to justice project they cited Professor Frank
Sander’s Pound Conference Paper which had suggested the timeliness of introducing alternative
processes into the courts.48 They noted that access to justice was concerned with the “rights of

42

Amy J. Cohen & Michal Alberstein, Progressive Constitutionalism and Alternative Movements in Law, 72 OHIO
ST. L. J. 1083, n.35 (2011). See generally, Jerome T. Barrett and Joseph P. Barrett, A History of Alternative Dispute
Resolution: The Story of a Political, Cultural, and Social Movement 182-183 (2004),
43

Warren Burger, Isn’t There A Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274, 275 (1983).

44

Frank E. A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Resolution Address at the National Conference on the Causes of Popular
Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice (April 7-9, 1976) in 70 F. R. D. 79 (1976), at 111. [A. Levin and
R. Wheeler eds. The Pound Conference: Perspectives on Justice in the Future (St. Paul, MN, West Publishing Co.
1979) 111].
45

Frank E. A. Sander, Alternative Methods of Dispute Resolution: An Overview, 37 U. FLA. L. REV. 1 (1985).

46

Frank Sander & Mariana Hernandez Crespo, A Dialogue Between Professors Frank Sander and Mariana
Hernandez Crespo: Exploring the Evolution of the Multi-Door Courthouse, 5 U. ST. THOMAS L. J. 665, 671 (2008).
The court is where the cases are, so it is natural to have the court as one door of the multi-door courthousethat is the idea. But it could be that the court could be over here and the other processes [arbitration,
mediation, etc.] could be over there; there is nothing inherent [in the scheme] that prevents this. Id.
47

Mauro Cappelletti & Bryant Garth, Access to Justice: The Newest Wave in the Worldwide Movement to Make
Rights Effective, 27 BUFF. L. REV. 181 (1978) [hereinafter Cappelletti & Garth, The Newest Wave].
48

Id. at 225, n. 144 (citing F. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing 21, a paper prepared for the original Pound
Conference in 1976).

8

ordinary people,”49 who had struggled with the legal system. It was focused on giving effective
rights to the “have-nots” against the “haves,”50-- “consumers against merchants, tenants against
landlords and employees against employers.”51 Cappelletti and Garth assumed that arbitration
was a process for “consenting parties,”52 and that courts would continue to play an important role
in the development and enforcement of rights.53 Nowhere in their report or their subsequent
article explaining the report did Cappelletti and Garth imply that ADR processes would replace
courts or that consent would be eliminated from consensual ADR processes.
B. Exporting ADR and the Rule of Law
As the third wave in the access to justice movement, ADR was soon recognized for its
potential to promote the rule of law in developing countries.54 Africa represents one example of
where this vision was realized.55 In an effort to manage and prevent conflict, several
organizations such as the World Bank,56 the United States Agency for International
Development, and the American Bar Association, actively engaged in exporting ADR and
mediation training programs to Africa. The underling idea was that the resolution of ordinary
disputes in a society would help to ensure the stability needed for preventing more serious
Cappelletti & Garth, The Newest Wave, supra note 47, at 182 (“inspired by the desire to make the rights of
ordinary people real.”)
49

50

Id. at 241.

51

Id. at 195.

52

Id. at 232.

53

Id. at 228, 239.

54

See generally William Davis & Helga Trku, Access to Justice and Alternative Dispute Resolution, 2011 J. DISP.
RESOL. 47 (2011). But see Cynthia Alkon, Lost in Translation: Can Exporting ADR Harm Rule of Law
Development?, 2011 J. DISP. RESOL. 165 (2011) (questioning the viability of establishing ADR programs in
countries with corrupt legal systems); Jean Sternlight, Is Alternative Dispute Resolution Consistent with the Rule of
Law? Lessons From Abroad, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 569 (2007). For a critical view of exporting ADR, see Eduardo R.
C. Capulong, Mediation and the Neocolonial Legal Order: Access to Justice and Self-Determination in the
Philippines, 27 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 641 (2012).
55

See Jacqueline Nolan-Haley, Mediation and Access to Justice in Africa: Perspectives from Ghana, 21 HARV.
NEGOT. L REV. 59, 711-74 (2015).
56

In addition to Africa, the World Bank has promoted ADR projects to improve access to justice in several other
countries. See Vivek Maru, Access to Justice and Legal Empowerment: A Review of World Bank Practice, 2 HAGUE
J. ON THE RULE OF L. 259, 259-81 (2010).

9

conflicts. Recognizing that access to justice is an essential element of the rule of law, many of
these programs included ADR in rule of law projects.57
ADR was also promoted as a vehicle to improve access to justice in countries with
dysfunctional court systems.58 However, in some countries, the claim of attaining access to
justice through ADR may be dubious. Where there is no effective recourse to the court system
for poor people, such as in many areas of Latin American, parties are in a weak bargaining
position in ADR processes. This situation has been described in Latin America as creating three
tiers of justice: private arbitration, for those who can afford to hire an arbitrator, the justice
system for those who can afford a lawyer, and mediation centers which are generally reserved for
the poor who can afford neither. If, parties do not accept what they are offered in mediation,
then they receive nothing.59
C. Assumptions about ADR and Access to Justice
In the United States, access to justice has historically been associated with access to the
courts. That view is changing. The Dispute Resolution Section of the American Bar Association
has argued for a broader definition that includes “access to legal representation, access to
resolution of issues, and access to quality processes that do not necessarily include the court
systems.” 60 ADR processes are included within this expanded definition based on the
assumption that they will offer greater access to justice.61 Online dispute resolution is now

57

More recently, scholars have questioned the efficacy of mandatory mediation in the context of labor disputes in
South Africa and Mozambique. See Stella Vettori, Mandatory Mediation: An Obstacle to Access to Justice, 15
AFRICAN HUM. RTS L. J. 355 (2015).
58

See, e.g., Steven Austermiller, Mediation in Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Second Application, 9 YALE HUM. RTS &
DEV. L. J. 132 (2006) (noting the paradox that “[A] nation born out of mediation turns to mediation again, this time
to rescue its judiciary and promote the rule of law.” Id. at 1).
59

Mariana Hernandez Crespo. A Systemic Perspective of ADR in Latin America: Enhancing the Shadow of the Law
Through Citizen Participation, 10 CARDOZO J. OF CONFLICT RESOL. 91, 108, 115 (2008) (arguing that where ADR
processes are introduced into dispute resolution systems that lack effective courts, as in many Latin American
countries, there is a negative effect on access to justice.” Id. at 115).
60

ABA White Paper, supra note 15.

61

Id.
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proposed as a means of achieving greater access to justice.62 Similar assumptions about access
to justice underlie the push for mediation in other countries. For example, the European Union
has expanded the understanding of access to justice to include “judicial as well as extrajudicial
dispute resolution methods.”63 Through a series of directives, it has promoted mediation and
online dispute resolution.64 Mediation was introduced in Russia based on the assumption that it
would offer a “reliable guarantee to citizens of access to justice within a reasonable time.” 65 In
Bosnia and Herzegovina mediation was promoted to improve judicial efficiency and promote
democracy and the rule of law.66
The follow section will discuss how the consensual aspects of consensual ADR processes
have diminished over the last four decades.
III.

The Erosion of Consent In ADR

Over the last forty-one years since the first Pound Conference was convened in 1976, modern
ADR and in particular, mediation, has become institutionalized in the justice system of countries
throughout the world. In the United States, institutionalization includes mandates to mediate
through compulsory court-annexed mediation programs. Beginning with the Civil Justice

62

See Court Compass: Mapping the Future of User Access Through Technology, INSTITUTE FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM (May 2017),
http://iaals.du.edu/sites/default/files/documents/publications/court_compass_mapping_the_future.pdf (last visited
Jan. 25, 2018). See generally J. J. Prescott, Improving Access to Justice in State Courts with Platform Technology,
70 VANDERBILT L. REV. 1993 (2017). Salter, supra note 23.
63

See Directive 2008/52/EC of the EU Parliament and of the Council on Certain Aspects of Mediation in Civil and
Commercial Matters, 2008 O.J. L. 136/3, ¶ 5, http://eur
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:136:0003:0008:En:PDF. Mediation was offered as a
“cost-effective and quick extrajudicial resolution of disputes in civil and commercial matters through processes
tailored to the needs of the parties . . . . ” Id. ¶ 6.
64

In addition to the Mediation Directive the EU has issued a Directive on Consumer ADR, http://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32013L0011. The EU also has an Online Dispute Resolution
(ODR) Platform, available at https://ec.europa.eu/info/live-work-travel-eu/consumers/resolve-your-consumercomplaint_en.
Kathryn Hendley, Resistance, Indifference or Ignorance? Explaining Russians’ Nonuse of Mediation, 32 OHIO ST.
J DISP. RESOL. 487, 489 (2017).
65

66

Steven Austermiller, Mediation in Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Second Application, 9 YALE HUM. RTS & DEV. L.
J. 132 (2006).
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Reform Act67 mandatory mediation has been an acceptable form of dispute resolution68 with the
understanding that there is a distinction between coercion into mediation and coercion in the
mediation process.69 Compulsory participation in mediation was considered by Professor Sander
to be “a temporary expedient to get people to experience this process that the users find so
helpful.”70 Following suit, other countries began developing various models of mandatory71 and
quasi-mandatory mediation programs which employ a variety of benefits and sanctions in order
to incentivize parties to use mediation.72

67

The Act authorized each federal district to create ADR programs. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (1990).

68

In Re Atlantic Pipe, 304 F.3d 136 (1st Cir. 2002)(holding the ADR Act of 1998 requires courts to obtain party
consent only when they order arbitration and not when they order the use of other ADR processes such as
mediation).
Frank Sander et al., Judicial (Mis)use of ADR? A Debate, 27 TOL. L. REV. 885, 886 (1996). Sander’s famous
distinction hold sway even today. See e.g., ADR and Civil Justice: CJC ADR Working Group Interim Report, CIVIL
JUSTICE COUNCIL 47 (Oct. 2017) [hereinafter CJC Interim Report], https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wpcontent/uploads/2017/10/interim-report-future-role-of-adr-in-civil-justice-20171017.pdf.
69

Voluntariness in engaging in mediation is subject to a very important distinction which was first drawn in
the 1970s by Professor Frank Sander...Continued voluntary participation within a confidential mediation
process once commenced (with freedom from criticism or sanction for withdrawal and return to litigation)
is a fundamental and non-negotiable tenet of mediation. But this does not mean that requiring parties to
engage in mediation in the first place, or sanctioning their failure to do so, necessarily subverts its
principles or reduces its effectiveness. Parties must always be free not to settle, but it may be legitimate for
a civil justice system to require them to attend settlement.
70

Sander et al., supra note 69, at 886.

71

In the case of England, as a result of amendments to the Civil Procedure Rule, courts have the discretion to
impose costs on a party who unreasonably refuses to mediate. Some scholars have argued that this creates a
situation in which parties are deprived of any choice. Genn, supra note 29 (2012). More recently, the Civil Justice
Working Council on ADR issued an interim report indicating that the group was considering whether to mandate the
use of ADR processes. CJC Interim Report, supra note 69, at 45-50. For a discussion of the various incentives and
sanctions employed in EU countries, see Prof. Giuseppe De Palo and Dr. Leonardo D’Urso, Achieving a Balanced
Relationship between Mediation and Judicial Proceedings, in EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE MEDIATION DIRECTIVE 12-13 (2016). For a discussion of Europe’s turn towards compulsory mediation, see
Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Is Europe Headed Down the Primrose Path with Mandatory Mediation, 37 N.C.J INT’L
L. & COM. REG. 981 (2012).
72

See e.g., Julie Macfarlane, Culture Change-A Tale of Two Cities and Mandatory Court-Connected Mediation,
2002 J. DISP. RES. 241 (2002)(discussing features of mandatory mediation programs in two Canadian cities, Toronto
and Ottawa); Vicki Waye, Mandatory Mediation in Australia’s Civil Justice System, 45 COMMON L. WORLD REV.
214 (2016) (critical of mandatory mediation developments in Australia); In some countries mediation may be
mandatory in theory, but not in practice. Vettori, supra note 57, at 377 (discussing mediation practice in South
Africa).
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Beyond the courts, the erosion of traditional consensual features has also become apparent as
mediation is used as regulatory tool by legislatures. Professor Lydia Nussbaum has explored the
legislature’s role in the US in going beyond institutionalization and mandating mediation for
private disputes.73 Not only are parties forced to mediate in cases where substantive legal rights
are involved, but they may also be instructed with a great deal of specificity--to mediate in good
faith, 74 to discuss specific topics, and whether they are allowed legal counsel.75
In the case of arbitration, consent has disappeared in some contexts. Scholars refer to an
“arbitration epidemic” that deprives workers and consumers of their rights, including access to
the courts.76 Vulnerable populations, including nursing home patients,77 have been shut out of
courts, and required to arbitrate. However, few who are cut off from the courts and required to
arbitrate actually do so.78 Consent is further diluted when forced arbitration clauses are coupled
with class action bans so that parties cannot join with other aggrieved parties in obtaining access
to courts.79
In the following sections I discuss how diminished consent is not compatible with true access
to justice.

73

Lydia Nussbaum, Mediation as Regulation: Expanding State Governance over Private Disputes, 2 UTAH L. REV.
361 (2016).
74

Good faith requirements have generated significant litigation on the meaning of good faith. See James Coben &
Peter Thompson, Disputing Irony: A Systematic Look at Litigation about Mediation, 11 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 43
(2006).
75

Nussbaum, supra note 73, at 362.

76

Katherine V.W. Stone and Alexander J.S. Colvin, The Arbitration Epidemic: Mandatory Arbitration Deprive
Workers of their Rights, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Dec. 7, 2015), http://www.epi.org/publication/the-arbitrationepidemic/.
77

Kindred Nursing Centers Ltd. Partnership v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 1421 (2017); Marmet Health Care Center, Inc., v.
Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201 (2012).
78

Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the Private in Courts and the Erasure
of Rights, 124 YALE L. J. 2804, 2808 (2015).
79

In July 2017, the Consumer Federal Protection Bureau attempted to change this situation in part by prohibiting
banks, credit card companies and their financial institutions from including mandatory arbitration clauses in new
contracts (Arbitration Agreements Rule). This effort was thwarted by the passage of a joint resolution in Congress
and signed by the President on November 1, 2017.
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A. The Problem with Diminished Consent in Mediation and Arbitration
Mediation
Mediation has traditionally been understood as a consensual process based on party selfdetermination.80 This means simply that the parties who are affected by a dispute decide the
outcome of that dispute. While consent may be understood differently by some individuals
engaged in court practice,81 it remains a core value of mediation. When parties are required to
participate in court mediation, consent is diminished and there is the potential for coercion.
Diminished-consent mediation is particularly problematic in cases where unequal bargaining
power exists82 as subtle forms of pressure may be exerted on parties in court annexed mediation
programs.83
Take the example of self-represented parties who enter into agreements in ignorance of their
legal rights, thus risking potentially unjust results, 84 or pro se parties participating in mediation
foreclosure programs. Good mediation practice contemplates that parties come to the table with
relatively equal bargaining power and the ability to exercise self-determination. This is generally
not the profile of homeowners who participate in foreclosure mediation. Without legal defenses,
they are vulnerable and lack power to make decisions about whether their loans can be
modified.85 In both of these cases, given the benefits that flow from procedural justice such as

80

See ABA Model Standards, supra note 22, Standard I.

Nancy Welsh, Making Deals in Court-Connected Mediation: What’s Justice Got to Do with It?, 79 Wash. U L. Q.
787 (2001)
81

82

There are other areas of power imbalance such as that which exists between self-represented litigants and debt
collection attorneys in consumer credit actions. Some attorneys may attempt to collect debts that are not owed.
This problem is not limited to the United States. See Yedan Li, From “Access to Justice” to “Barrier to
Justice”? An Empirical Examination of Chinese Court-Annexed Mediation, 3 ASIAN J. OF L. AND SOC’Y (2016).
83

84

Jacqueline Nolan-Haley, Court Mediation and the Search for Justice through Law, 74 WASH. L. Q. 47 (1996).
Amy Applegate and Connie Beck, Self-Represented Parties in Mediation: Fifty years Later it Remains the Elephant
in the Room, 51 FAM. CT. REV. 87 (2013) (proposing special guidelines for mediators who work with selfrepresented parties); Robert Rubinson, Indigency, Secrecy and Questions of Quality: Minimizing the Risk of Bad
Mediation for Low-Income Litigants, 100 MARQUETTE L. REV. 1353, 1354 (2017) (noting that the risk of poor
mediation by unskilled mediators intensifies when there are large numbers of low-income litigants who participate
in court-annexed mediation programs).
Lydia Nussbaum, ADR’s Place in Foreclosure: Remedying the Flaws of a Securitized Housing Market, 34
CARDOZO L. REV. 1889, 1953 (2013). The plight of the pro se party in mediation foreclosure programs is
85
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voice and participation, these parties may be quite satisfied with the mediation process,86 and as
a result, may be satisfied with the agreements they reach. But these outcomes may not always be
desirable from a justice perspective; procedures which leave parties satisfied may also deprive
them of substantive justice. 87
Arbitration
The erosion of consent in arbitration is ubiquitous.88 Diminished-consent arbitration is
perhaps most evident in the growing use of boilerplate and adhesion contracts. Professor Jennifer
Reynolds has written about “consent fictions” such as adhesion contracts which bind consumers
to agreements which they were unaware they were making. 89 When adhesion contracts are part
dramatically illustrated in GMAC Mortgage, LLC v. Willoughby. GMAC and Willoughby entered into a loan
modification agreement which provided that if Willoughby made all the trial payments, the agreement would
become permanent. Willoughby carried out her part of the bargain. GMAC then required her to re-enter mediation
and accept a modification of her first mediation agreement made two years earlier. She moved to enforce the first
agreement and was unsuccessful. In the course of the proceedings, her home was sold. The Supreme Court of New
Jersey reversed the judgment of the Appellate Division and the case was remanded to the chancery court. The
court’s language is instructive:
The chancery court should have granted Willoughby’s pro se motion to enforce the agreement. As we have
said before, homeowners facing foreclosure –many of whom do not have the benefit of counsel, are
particularly vulnerable when mired in financial difficulties. Our chancery courts are courts of equity and
therefore must take pains to ensure that such homeowners receive the protection of the law from lending
institutions and servicing agents who may seek unfair advantage. See 165 A.3d 787 at 796.
86

It is interesting to note that in foreclosure mediations, even when parties may lose their homes, they report that the
mediation process itself was valuable and fair. This perception has been attributed to the procedural justice benefits
of voice and venting. See Jill S. Tanz and Martha McClintock, The Physiologic Stress Response During Mediation,
32 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 29, 59 (2017).
87

See R.L. Marcus, Misgivings About American Exceptionalism: Court Access as A Zero-Sum Game, LEGAL
STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER SERIES, RESEARCH PAPER NO. 248, U.C. HASTINGS C. OF THE L., 53, 56 (2017),
https://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=67406609202008006512500101408602210103804600702005903412
706608911012611009907203002805603305800604205501402402910911412409210305308205400106012112307
901209909907300606105306608703106409207503012501407003106502412707400102608209708206501912209
6075024104&EXT=pdf (arguing that procedures that satisfy [the] participants and create the appearance of justice
might also frustrate correct resolution of disputes and thus stymie real justice).
88

Unfairness may often result from non-consensual arbitration. See Alexander J.S. Colvin, An Empirical Study of
Employment Arbitration: Case Outcomes and Processes, J. OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming 2017)
(demonstrating the repeat player effect in employer arbitration. The study shows that employee win rates and award
amounts are significantly lower where the employer is involved in multiple arbitration cases). For recent criticisms
and proposals for reform, see Szalai, supra note 25 (proposing an amendment to the Federal Arbitration Act based
on privacy rules recently adopted by the Federal Communications Commission). See also Arbitration Fairness Act
of 2017, H.R. 1374, 115th Cong. (2017).
89

Jennifer W. Reynolds, Luck v. Justice: Consent Intervenes, but for Whom?, 14 PEPP. DISP. RES. L. J. 245 (2014).
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of arbitration and courts accept this, the effect is that arbitration displaces voluntary dispute
resolution. 90 With respect to boilerplate, parties without their consent are subjected to
boilerplate provisions that eliminate their access to courts through compulsory arbitration
provisions. This occurs despite the fact that in some types of cases people prefer to have their
disputes heard by a court.91 Most people do not read boiler plate and even when they do, there is
evidence to show that they do not understand it.92
B. The Critics
There is no shortage of critics when it comes to forms of ADR which give short shrift to
consent. 93 Owen Fiss’ early critique, Against Settlement, explicitly focused on the problem of
diminished consent, arguing that with ADR settlement processes “consent is often coerced….
and although dockets are trimmed, justice may not be done.”94 Similar concerns have prompted
scholars to call for caution when state interests rather than party consent promote and drive
ADR. 95 Other scholars expressed concern for the poor, the disenfranchised and women.96

90

Lisa B. Bingham, Self-Determination in Dispute System Design and Employment Arbitration, 56 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 873 (2002).
91

A study by Pew Charitable Trusts revealed that while private parties most often prefer to have their bank dispute
cases heard in court, contractual obligations often leave them with no choice but to arbitrate. Consumers Want the
Right to Resolve Bank Disputes in Court, THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (Aug. 17, 2016),
http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/issue-briefs/2016/08/consumers-want-the-right-to-resolve-bankdisputes-in-court (last visited Jan. 26, 2018).
92

MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW 108 (2013).
See Jeff Sovern, Elayne E. Greenberg, Paul F. Kirgis & Yuxiang Liu, “Whimsy Little Contracts” with Unexpected
Consequences: An Empirical Analysis of Consumer Understanding of Arbitration Agreements (2014). Working
Papers. Paper 1 (describing online survey of 668 consumers showing that most consumers are unaware of and do
not understand the import of arbitration clauses in their consumer contracts).
93

See, e.g., Stephan Landsman, ADR and the Cost of Compulsion, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1593 (2005). Concern is not
limited to the United States. See CJC Interim Report, supra note 69, at 45-50 (describing contemporary debates in
England over the use of mandatory ADR/mediation provisions).
94

Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L J. 1073, 1075 (1984).
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Lorna McGregor, Alternative Dispute Resolution and Human Rights: Developing a Rights-Based Approach
through the ECHR, 26 EUR. J. INT’L L., 607, 634 (2015).
96

See, e.g., Robert A. Baruch Bush & Joseph P. Folger, Mediation and Social Justice: Risks and Opportunities, 27
OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 24 (2012). See Richard Delgado et al, Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of
Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1359 (1994); Trina Grillo, The Mediation
Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L. J. 1545, 1547-51 (1991); Richard L. Abel, The
Contradictions of Informal Justice, in R. L. ABEL, THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE, VOL. 1 287 (1982). For an
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Recent critics observe that “second class justice taking shape...allowing no choice-taking place in
secret.” 97
Reflecting on his seminal study Cappelletti himself recognized what he called the “hard
questions’ in the third wave of the access to justice movement.98 These questions included the
risk of providing only second class justice with lack of procedural fairness typical of ordinary
litigation or abuse by stronger parties where there was a lack of equal bargaining power. 99
Considering the breadth of mandatory arbitration provisions today in contracts related to nursing
homes, credit cards, car rentals, medical professionals, investment brokers and many consumer
services, these concerns have come to fruition. The breadth of such provisions are at odds with
Cappelletti’s view that ADR, the third wave of the access to justice movement, is about justice
and fairness, and that it reflects “a philosophy which accepts alternative remedies and processes,
in so far as such alternatives can help to make justice fair and more accessible.”100
IV.

Informed Consent
At a meeting of the American Bar Association, Dispute Resolution Section in 2016, an

ethics panel engaged in a discussion of “Hot Topics and Old Chestnuts. “101 The concept of
informed consent was located in the “old chestnut” category. Despite its placement in this
category, the principle of informed consent retains contemporary salience. Facebook, for
example, has been criticized in recent years for conducting experiments on 700,000 users

Australian perspective, see Mary Anne Noone, ADR, Public Interest Law and Access to Justice: The Need for
Vigilance, 37 MONASH U. L. REV. 57 (2011).
97

Sanford M. Jaffee & Linda Stamato, Private Justice: Losing Our Day in Court, 34 ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH
COST OF LITIG. 163 (2016).
98

Cappelletti, supra note 40, at 288.

99

Id. at 288, 290

100

Id. at. 295

101

ABA Section of Dispute Resolution, ADR Ethics: Hot Topics and Old Chestnuts, in PRACTICE AREA TRACKS
ABA SECTION OF DISP. RESOL. 2016 SPRING CONFERENCE, 16 (2016),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/dispute_resolution/2016-springconference/Programs_by_Practice_Area.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Jan. 26, 2018). The program was entitled
ADR Ethics: Hot Topics and Old Chestnuts: A Roundtable Conversation in ADR Ethics.
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without their informed consent.102 Pharmaceutical companies have been criticized by human
rights groups for failing to honor informed consent when introducing drugs to developing
countries.103 Patients have been warned to be vigilant with doctors who fail to obtain informed
consent.104
A. The Doctrine of Informed Consent
Informed consent, is deeply engrained in American culture as an ethical, moral and legal
concept.105 In situations where the principle of informed consent applies, it is understood that a
person’s consent must be based on relevant information and be voluntary. Informed consent is a
foundational principle that promotes human dignity, advances autonomy, and enhances party
self-determination. This doctrine originated in medicine and was subsequently adopted by the
legal profession. 106 Whether based in medicine or law, informed consent is not a one size fits all
proposition but it depends upon context.107
B. Consent in Mediation and Arbitration

102

Dr. Cathere Flick, Informed Consent and the Facebook Emotional Manipulation Study, 12 RES. ETHICS 14
(2015), http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/1747016115599568; Amy Bucher, Facebooks Informed
Consent Problem, AMY BUCHER, PH.D. (June 30, 2014), http://www.amybucherphd.com/20140630facebooksinformed-consent-problem/ (last visited Jan. 26, 2018); Christopher Zara, Facebook Experiment Raises Legal
Questions: Could Lawsuit Follow Mood Manipulation Research?, INT’L BUS. TIMES (June 30, 2014),
http://www.ibtimes.com/facebook-experiment-raises-legal-questions-could-lawsuit-follow-mood-manipulationresearch-1615970 (last visited Jan. 26, 2018).
Stacey B. Lee, Informed Consent: Enforcing Pharmaceutical Companies’ Obligations Abroad, 12 HEALTH AND
HUM. RTS. J. 1 (2010) (discussing the Pfizer Company’s activities in Nigeria)
103
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Nichole Bazemore, Not all Doctors Obtain Informed Consent, FORBES (Mar. 28, 2016, 7:00 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/amino/2016/03/28/not-all-doctors-get-informed-consent-heres-why-its-hurtingpatients/#50cd5762496c.
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See genreally RUTH R. FADEN AND TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT
(1986).
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Mark Spiegel, Lawyering and Client Decisionmaking: Informed Consent and the Legal Profession, 128 U. PA. L.
REV. 41 (1979).
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Christine Grady, Steven R. Cummings, Michael C. Rowbotham, Michael V. McConnell, Euan A. Ashley,
Gagandeep Kang, The Changing Face of Informed Consent, 376 NEW ENGLAND J. MED. 856 (2017).
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Informed consent has evolved from the fields of law and medicine to become a
foundational principle in consensual ADR processes. 108 In mediation, for example, the Model
Standards of Practice for Mediators, interpret party self-determination as the act of making “free
and informed choices as to process and outcome.”109 The mediation ethics codes of many other
countries also consider informed consent to be a foundational value.110 Likewise, arbitration is
frequently referred to as a matter of consent, not coercion.111 Federal courts frequently remind
us that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) does not require parties to arbitrate when they have not
agreed to do so.112
The principle of informed consent in consensual ADR processes is not an end in itself but
is a means of achieving the basic goal of fairness. Fairness has both procedural and substantive
elements. For example, fairness requires that parties know what they are doing when they
commit to participate in a process such as mediation, that they understand their right to withdraw
from the process at any time, and finally, that they understand the outcome reached in mediation.
113

I do not claim that informed consent guarantees access to justice. Consent is not a magic

wand that necessarily produces just results. Professor Jennifer Reynolds has powerfully
reminded us of how luck often intervenes and distorts the justice of mediated settlements.114 In
theory, however, consent remains a foundational principle in ADR processes such as mediation
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See Jacqueline Nolan-Haley, Informed Consent in Mediation: A Guiding Principle for Truly Educated
Decisionmaking, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 775 (1999); Michael T. Colatrella Jr., Informed Consent in Mediation:
Promoting Pro Se Parties’ Informed Settlement Choice While Honoring the Mediator’s Ethical Duties, 15 CARDOZO
J. DISP. RES. 705 (2014).
109
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See, e.g., EU Code of Conduct for Mediators, EUR. COMMISSION (2004),
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MEDIATION INSTITUTE, http://www.imimediation.org/practitioners/code-professional-conduct/; see generally,
Melissa Katsoris, Does Nationality Influence Neutrality: The Ethical Standards and Expectations of International
Mediators, 39 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 695 (2016).
111
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Jennifer W. Reynolds, Luck v. Justice: Consent Intervenes, but for Whom?, 14 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L. J. 245
(2014).
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and arbitration. It is invoked to legitimize many different types of behaviors that might
otherwise be objectionable such as the same judge acting as a mediator and trial judge in a case,
the same person acting as both arbitrator and mediator in the med-arb process,115 disclosure of
confidential information, and mediator conflicts of interest.
C. Erosion of Consent
In recent years there has been a withering away of informed consent in several fields in
addition to ADR. Lawyers for example do not always practice informed consent in counseling
clients116 despite the clear mandate of the ABA Rules.117 Pharmaceutical companies do not
always honor informed consent when experimenting with new drug products in developing
countries. While informed consent may be part of the protocol, it is selectively followed with
disclosures that are less than candid and fail to reveal all the serious risks involved in clinical
trials. 118 Some physicians speak quite openly of the erosion of informed consent in medical
research.119 Bioethicists argue for limits to informed consent in developing fields such as
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Kristen M. Blankley, Keeping a Secret from Yourself? Confidentiality When the Same Neutral Serves Both as
Mediator and as Arbitrator in the Same Case, 63 BAYLOR L. REV. 319, 360 (2011). For a discussion of why
informed consent does not provide true self-determination in the Med-Arb process, see Brian Pappas, Med-Arb and
the Legalization of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 20 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV.157, 191 (2015).
116

Kim Kovach, The Duty to Disclose Litigation Risks and Opportunities for Settlement: The Case of Informed
Decision-Making, 33 LAVERNE L. REV. 71 (2011).
Model Code of Responsibility Rule 1.4(b) requires that lawyers “explain a matter to the extent reasonably
necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT r. 1.4(b) (AM. BAR. ASS’N, Discussion Draft 1983).
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Ruth Macklin, Erosion of Informed Consent in Medical Research, THE DOCTOR’S TABLET BLOG (Nov. 16, 2016),
http://blogs.einstein.yu.edu/the-erosion-of-informed-consent-in-medical-research/ (last visited Jan. 26, 2018);
George J. Annas & Catherine L. Annas, Legally Blind: The Therapeutic Illusion in the Support Study of Extremely
Premature Infants, 30 J. OF CONTEMP. HEALTH L. AND POL’Y, 1, 2 (2013) (strongly disagreeing with the claim “that
medical research requires abandoning or diluting informed consent or treating patients as passive objects for the
valid purpose of improving the quality of care for all.” Id.). Sabrina Tavernise, Premature Babies Study Raises
Debate Over Risks and Ethical Consent, N.Y. TIMES (Sep. 7, 2015) (quoting George J. Annas, director of the Center
for Health Law, Ethics and Human Rights at Boston University School of Public Health “the consensus in the
bioethics community was that the informed consent was not adequate, and that hasn’t changed.”).
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biobanking.120 Others endorse specific rationales for waiving consent in medical research.121 In
the field of precision medicine122 which promotes the ideal of individualized health plans, 123
bioethics scholars describe a drifting away from the principle of informed consent,124 and patient
empowerment.125 The shift away from fidelity to informed consent principles has consequences
that matter to human dignity. In the words of one bio-ethicist, in moving away from the
principle of informed consent we “drift away from showing [people] the respect they deserve.”126
The erosion of informed consent in the field of precision or personalized medicine shares
similarities to what is happening in ADR with its promise of personalized justice. Advances in
genomic medicine have led bioethics scholars to describe an ideological shift in informed
consent resulting in a dilution of patient autonomy, a “turn away from “patient empowerment”
and toward expert-mediated decision-making in the clinical setting.”127 One example of the shift
away from informed consent in precision medicine is seen in efforts to produce more perfect
babies. Bioethics literature refers to the enthusiasm for pre-natal testing in the search for fitter
babies, an increase in the routine of prenatal genetic testing and a decrease in offering an

120
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World of Biobanking, in THE ETHICS OF RESEARCH BIOBANKING 25, 25-32 (Solbakk, Holm, & Hofmann eds., 2009).
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authentic process that permits patients to give informed consent to this testing.128 Concerned that
with these efforts we are moving away from giving people the respect to which they are entitled,
one bioethics scholar has commented: “In our excitement about the technological capacity to
gather genomic data at an ever-lower cost, we are drifting away from what has long been a basic
ethical commitment; to offer persons a process that enables them to provide informed consent
before they or anyone else accesses their genetic information.…It would be painfully ironic if, in
our pursuit of personalized medicine in the sense of medicine tailored to persons’ genomes, we
inadvertently abandoned our pursuit of personalized medicine in the sense of medicine that
shows respect for persons.” 129
Could a similar observation be made with respect to ADR access to justice claims? What has
happened to the individualized justice based on party self-determination that was promised by
ADR proponents? Is it possible that future generations will conclude that in their enthusiasm to
be efficient, reduce business costs, clear dockets, and relieve burdened court systems,
policymakers imposed mediation and arbitration on several groups of vulnerable people in the
name of access to justice, and in so doing, abandoned the core values upon which their
foundation rests?
To prevent this from happening we need to engage our imagination, and begin to reflect on
what it means to cultivate an “access to justice consciousness” from an ADR perspective. In my
view, a preliminary sketch begins with fidelity to informed consent principles. Although this in
itself does not assure access to justice, its absence signals vulnerability in the search for access to
justice. Following consent, a variety of expectations come to mind including fairness, equality
of access to the legal system as well as to alternatives to court-based dispute resolution,
awareness of ADR options,130 procedural justice, and substantive justice. Respect for the dignity
of litigants from all economic backgrounds is at the core of “access to justice consciousness.”
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Conclusion
The erosion of consent in ADR processes implicates the quality of justice to which the
access to justice reform movement has aspired. The history of the access to justice movement
shows that it was concerned with securing the rights of ordinary people. However,
implementation of ADR processes, the third wave of the access to justice movement, has in
several respects minimized the rights of ordinary people by diminishing the role of consent and
in some cases, restricting access to the courts. This is not to claim that courts should be the
exclusive forum for resolving disputes. Nor is it to [deny] claim that ADR processes such as
mediation and arbitration should be readily available under the rubric of access to justice or that
they have potential to serve underrepresented groups in certain kinds of cases. 131 It seems clear,
however, that the original concern of the modern access to justice movement was focused on
protecting the rights of ordinary people, not with restricting their access to the courts. We should
be faithful to that intent.
Given the power of established business interests to restrict the rights of ordinary people,
whether they be consumers, employees or home owners, we are at a time in our history where
greater modesty is called for in the claims we make about achieving access to justice through
ADR processes. For mediation and arbitration to offer access to justice, they must be understood
and practiced as consensual processes. Consent outperforms coercion. With the resurgence of
interest today in the goal of achieving access to justice, it makes sense to step back, review the
origins of the access to justice movement, and reflect on the direction in which it is moving. This
approach will be useful in cultivating an ADR “access to justice consciousness” which will resist
the erosion of consent in ADR, raise awareness, and inspire action to secure equal access to
justice for potential litigants from all economic backgrounds.
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